The article aims at disentangling the existing relation between job precariousness and political participation at the individual level illustrating that the former can be considered an emerging 
Introduction
The current state of the labour market in Europe is an issue of great concern in public debate.
The media have been discussing the growing presence of precarious working conditions while scholarly studies have examined the rise of segmented labour markets. Labour-related protests and mobilizations have also received considerable attention. The Indignados and Mileuristas in Spain, and Movimenti Precari in Italy are among the most well known Southern European examples (Castañeda 2012; Lima and Artiles 2013; Murgia and Armano 2012) , but similar movements are spreading all across Europe (Lahusen 2013) . The rise of the 'gig economy' and digital labour platforms suggests that these trends are likely to continue into the near future (Malin and Chandler 2016; Milkman and Ott 2014; Harvey et al. 2016; Webster 2016) . Nonetheless, the overwhelming attention given to collective mobilizations that seek to tackle precariousness and related issues such as austerity and cuts to benefits risks overlooking how individual workers are participating.
This article examines the effect of job precariousness on different forms of political participation among young precarious workers vis-à-vis regularly employed ones. In doing so, it seeks to identify and explain patterns and traits in how young people engage with and within the political arena. The well-known nexus between individual socio-demographic characteristics and political participation is taken into account by including all relevant socio-demographic characteristics and individual variables such as economic resources, time availability, civic skills (Brady et al. 1995) , household burden (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al. 2010; Schlozman et al. 1994; 1999) Geographically, the article focuses on people living in the city of Turin (Italy). This city is located in the Piedmont region, which was once the heartland of Italian manufacturing. However, since the 1980s it has been subject to a large and continuous process of de-industrialization increasing precarious working conditions in the labour market Bassoli and Monticelli 2017 ). The survey is based upon an original sample of people between 18 and 34-yearsof-age, divided into two major groups: temporary workers and permanently employed workers. The survey includes both institutional and non-institutional types of political behaviour (Tarrow 2013; Stolle and Hooghe 2011) .
The article is organized as follows: the first section presents the theoretical framework, emphasising the crucial interplay between individual variables -socio-economic characteristics, social capital and occupational status -with the local context; the second section presents the dataset and the methods and explains how factor analysis was used to identify youth-specific forms of participation; in the third section, hypotheses are tested through a set of logit regressions that show the decreasing relevance of the socio-economic status model (among youth) and confirm some wellknown hypotheses in the literature about political participation (the role of social capital and political interest); the final part of the article outlines the main empirical findings and discusses the potential of bridging political participation studies with sociology of work and industrial relations.
Occupational Status and Political Involvement: The State of the Art
Most people would agree that a properly functioning democracy requires citizens to actively participate in the political arena. They should have the opportunity to engage in the political system through the typical range of tools provided by representative democracies. Two of the most important tools are voting and involvement in party politics. But when it comes to challenging the status quo, citizens have historically deployed a different repertoire of actions, ranging from protests to violent actions and, more recently, shifting their focus from the State to markets with individual or collective forms of political consumerism aimed at positively or negatively discriminating between products for ethical, environmental and political reasons (Micheletti 2003; Forno and Graziano 2014) .
Nonetheless, one of the most striking and enduring findings in the field of political participation studies is the unequal distribution, across the population, of the propensity towards political activism (Stolle and Hooghe 2011) . Among the factors influencing these discrepancies identified by the traditional literature on political participation, we find economic resources, age, educational attainment, social capital, familial background and occupational status (Brady et al. 1995; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Lorenzini and Giugni 2012; Marien et al. 2010; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Schlozman et al. 1994; 1999; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009; Solt 2008 ).
More specifically, two broad strands of literature have tackled the relationship between employment and political participation. On the one hand are scholars who consider unemployment as a trigger for collective action and increased interest in socio-political issues (Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Gamson 1968; Wilkes 2004; Maurer and Mayer 2001; Hooghe 2011, Piven and Cloward 1977) . On the other hand, there are scholars who describe unemployment as a hindering factor for political activism (Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1978; 1993) . The first strand, often referred to as the 'grievance model' (Kern et al. 2015) , often considers any sort of resentment, once it is translated explicitly into political demands, as representing a strong incentive for political activism at the individual level (Gamson 1968; Gurr 2011; Wilkes 2004; Stolle and Hooghe 2011) . Similarly, others interpret unemployment as a boost for collective action and mobilization Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Maurer and Mayer 2001; Piven and Cloward 1977) . In other words, political participation is considered a viable way for marginalized social classes to escape from social isolation, express their discontent, make political claims and fight the social stigma attached to unemployment.
As for the second strand of literature, often referred to as the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al. 1993) , scholars have demonstrated that political participation is supported and fostered by the availability of individual resources: money, time, civic skills and social capital (Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1978; 1993) . Research on the impact of labour conditions has consistently shown that unemployed people tend to be less politically active than regular workers (Anderson 2001; Brady et al. 1995; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Driskell et al. 2008; Schlozman et al. 1999; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009 ).
Job Precariousness: The Missing Piece of the Puzzle
A rich body of literature has been produced in last decade with the goal of shedding light on the nuanced concept of precariousness. Scholars within the field of sociology of work believe that precariousness can be better defined by looking at the context and at the consequences of job conditions in terms of citizenship rights and social guarantees rather than by focusing on the type of contract (Mattoni and Vogiatzoglou 2014; Murgia and Armano 2012) . In fact, temporary contracts' conditions and related social guarantees may vary consistently across and within European countries, pointing out the necessity of going beyond mere contractual features to assess job-related degree of precariousness. In other words, workers with open-ended contracts might experience precariousness as much as, if not more than, workers with temporary contracts. In spite, and probably exactly because of this complexity, it is difficult to find a ready-made definition of precariousness in the literature.
Rather than a static condition, precariousness is often referred to as a multi-dimensional, complex process shaped by the dynamics of contemporary capitalism, the actions (and re-actions) of the people involved and the institutional mediation between the two (della Porta et al. 2016). As stated above, precariousness is not -or not only -the consequence of the contractual status, but it constitutes also a subjectively perceived condition. Given its broad scope, the concept of precariousness has been deployed to describe workers in disparate sectors ranging from university to the sharing and gig economy. As stated in a recent publication 'the precariat remains a contestable and polyvalent term, giving rise to and reason for endless definitional debates and classificatory clashes ' (Silvasti and Hänninen, 2016: 159) .
Returning to the role of occupational status in triggering political participation and, in particular, collective mobilizations, precariousness has been rarely analyzed within the framework of the grievance model. Classical studies on the diffusion of unemployed people's collective movements (Maurer and Mayer 2001; Piven and Cloward 1977) overshadow other occupational conditions, not to mention the difficulties that precarious youth face in self-organizing (Mattoni 2016 ) and accessing existing trade unions (Alberti et al. 2013; Keune 2015) .
More recent studies on precarious collective movements in Europe point toward the emergence of some kind of group-consciousness (Mattoni and Doerr 2007) even though this dynamic is difficult to assess given the simultaneous presence and the interplay with anti-austerity movements.
Only few studies examine the political attitudes and voting preferences of precarious workers based on single or cross-national case studies (Bay and Blekesaune 2002; Corbetta and Colloca 2013) .
As regards the civic voluntarism model, occupational status is usually treated as an unproblematic individual variable (Anderson 2001; Brady et al. 1995; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Driskell et al. 2008; Schlozman et al. 1999; Schur 2003; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009) .
Broadly speaking, the literature has dealt with the issue of occupational status and political participation by drawing a sharp distinction between full-time employment and unemployment, without identifying 'intermediate' situations (such as part-time jobs, self-employment or fixed-term contracts) or without differentiating between workers' individual characteristics. Indeed, employment for a young person today has a different meaning and significance compared to an older person, just as having a job has a differential effect on the individual life trajectory of a man or a woman (Schlozman et al. 1999 ). Analogously, part-time or temporary jobs might have different impacts on the repertoire of political actions compared to permanent full-time employment, as is the case for political attitudes (Corbetta and Colloca 2013; Eichhorst and Marx 2015; Marx 2014; Marx and Picot 2013) .
In light of this, this article aims at tackling the following research questions: Are precarious workers more prone to political activism than their counterparts holding open-ended jobs? Do they tend to choose representative channels of political participation or do they prefer to engage directly in grassroots and contentious political actions?
To begin answering these questions one should contextualize precariousness in the Italian case.
The Italian Socio-Economic and Political Context
The labour market of temporary jobs in Italy is two-tiered, with a primary segment offering well-paid job positions and a secondary segment offering short-term, low-paid work with no career and stabilization prospects. Therefore, temporary positions may be used as probationary periods serving as 'stepping stones' towards more rewarding positions (Scherer 2001 (Scherer , 2004 , while otherssuch as seasonal or casual jobs -are de facto potential traps that promise dead-end precarious careers (Bruno et al. 2014; Picchio 2012; Pavlopoulos 2013) . Moreover, a strong internal divide exists between precariously employed young people holding a university degree and those who do not (Barbieri 2011; Lodovici and Semenza 2012) . Scholars hypothesize that tertiary-educated young people tend to have more stable and better remunerated job trajectories than those who are less educated, since they possess a relatively higher bargaining and signalling power than their lower educated peers (Gebel and Giesecke 2011) . This dynamic is quite common across Southern European countries. What is more specific to each country is the impact of job precariousness on political participation patterns.
The political attitudes of Italian citizens have been widely studied in comparative terms. Italy often appears as an outlier, together with Portugal and Spain. Undoubtedly, welfare regimes, institutional incentives and cultural characteristics do affect social inclusion and specific forms of political participation . According to the existent literature, four aspects are unique to the Italian context. Firstly, Bay and Blekesaune (2002) showed that Italy is the only country in the EU where unemployed young people trust the democratic system more than their employed counterpart.
However, the overall level of satisfaction among Italian young people is impressively low: 'political distrust is a majority attitude in Italy. [...] . Bluntly stated, it can be maintained that it is those who are satisfied who form the deviant group in Italy' (Bay and Blekesaune 2002: 138) . Secondly, extreme political positions on the left-right scale persist among Italian young people, who are also significantly influenced by the political positioning of their parents and relatives (Ogris and Westphal 2005) . Thirdly, there is a general agreement about the salience of the precariousness issue. 'The traditional "lenses" focusing on the insiders/outsiders divide are inadequate to grasp the ongoing changes in the Italian labour market: at least a third category of workers, the 'mid-siders' (Jessoula et al. 2010:561-562) , -or precarious, is needed. Fourth, Italy is characterized by deeply rooted political subcultures. A political subculture is composed of a group of people that fit into the larger culture, but have specific political beliefs that set them apart from the larger group to varying degrees.
This means that while they may share some ideas and objectives with the dominant group (such as trust in representative democracy), they oppose the status quo, hoping to change certain aspects of the system to align it with their beliefs. This is specifically true for Italy.
Since the end of WWII, Italians strongly identified either in the Communist Party (PCI -Partito Comunista Italiano), in the Christian Democratic Party (DC -Democrazia Cristiana) or in the postFascist Party (MSI -Movimento Sociale Italiano). The first two parties were either in the majority or in the minority depending on the geographic area considered. The affiliation to a specific political subculture boosted political participation in various ways among different groups of the population (Corbetta and Colloca 2013) . Indeed, regional and local political subcultures seem to still help predict the behaviour of civil society organisations (Bassoli 2017) and that of the general population (Bassoli et al. 2011; Monticelli et al. 2016; Diamanti 2009 ).
Concerning the role played by occupational status in fostering political participation, Baglioni, della Porta and Graziano (2008: 846) show that, at least in Italy, unemployment translates into claims-making under two conditions: the presence of political entrepreneurs and their visibility in the public sphere. The activation of precarious youth might depend on similar conditions. Precariousness, in fact, represents nowadays an oft-invoked discursive framework in the media and in the political debate (Doerr et al. 2015) . Focusing on Italian precarious workers' political attitudes, Corbetta and Colloca (2013) found that precarious workers are different from their counterparts holding open-ended contracts or being unemployed: 'They did not share with unemployed people this feeling of political disillusion; in addition, they appeared ideologically to be the most leftist group (slightly more leftist than regular workers)' (Corbetta and Colloca 2013: 16) .
Findings for other continental countries are similar to a certain extent (Eichhorst and Marx 2015; Emmenegger et al. 2015; Marx 2014) . Marx and Picot (2013) show that a growing number of atypical workers in Germany exhibit a propensity to vote for New Left and Green parties rather than traditional Social-Democratic ones -the former being much better at representing these voters' preferences for redistributive policies and claims against the status-quo. However, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists on the range of political actions performed by precarious individuals other than their voting preferences.
As briefly described in a previous article (Bassoli and Monticelli 2017 ), all the above mentioned strands of research suggest that, in Italy, some systemic variables are creating the preconditions for a new political cleavage to emerge along the dimension of job precariousness. If one accepts the definition of political cleavage as linking 'the social reality of openness/closure of individual life chances to the likelihood of collective and organized action through the mediation of socially shared systems of beliefs' (Kriesi 2010: 674) , it appears clear how the impossibility to exit a condition of precariousness might trigger certain forms of political participation. The overarching theoretical background of this article is that, given the characteristics of contemporary capitalism and its consequences on labour market structures, precariousness might constitute an emerging political cleavage, especially amongst the most affected groups, including young people. In the following section, the main research hypotheses are described along with the main variables used in the analysis.
Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses
Many individual variables must be controlled for in order to test the relative impact of occupational status. We therefore use a conceptual framework built using insights from three strands of political participation studies. We build on the idea that political participation may be explained by individual characteristics (gender, age and education -the so called socio-economic status, SES model) and economic resources (the availability of time and civic skills) (Brady et al. 1995) .
The first layer, based upon the resource-based model, convincingly explains individual differences in political participation and departs from the SES model (age, class, education) while also considering other resources developed during an individual's lifetime, such as spare time, skills and income (Schlozman et al. 1994; 1999) .
As a second theoretical pillar, the literature has stressed the importance of gender in helping to explain differential gaps in political activism between men and women. According to these studies (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al. 2010; Lorenzini and Bassoli 2015) , the registered political participation gap is not related to gender itself, but to the specific resources that women and men have at their disposal within the household. Therefore, in a country like Italy, with a weak welfare regime and a strong imbalance in the division of domestic responsibility between men and women, abstention from politics may be stronger for women who provide more household care than men. Concerning occupational status, as described in Section 2, two competing hypotheses have been debated among scholars. According to many studies in this area, and coherent with the social marginalisation strand (Brady et al. 1995) , the unemployed should be less engaged in all forms of participation, while precariously employed youth should behave similarly to the 'fully' employed youth (Polavieja 1999; Schur 2003) . As mentioned earlier, the reason for this can be traced back to the role of social stigma. Unemployed people may feel that a stigma is attached to them which produces marginalisation and isolation in the contemporary context ) just as they did in the nineteen thirties (Lazarsfeld et al. 1981) . This phenomenon affects the political dimension.
However, considering the contentious politics of unemployment and precariousness in Italy ) and the fact that precarious workers and unemployed people are often found to be less stigmatized in Italy than in other countries (Murgia and Armano 2012; Bay and Blekesaune 2002), we expect that the level of political participation among precarious workers will actually be higher than their counterparts holding open-ended contracts (Hp. 2). This hypothesis must be controlled for by educational attainments because tertiary-educated young people tend to display more stable and better-remunerated job trajectories than less educated young people. At the same time, tertiary education is usually associated with higher levels of political participation. Thus the interaction between these two variables (education and precariousness) has to be assessed.
Hp 2 : Precarious workers are more likely to participate than workers with open-ended contracts.
In testing these hypotheses, a control for the interaction between occupational status and political positioning is included, given the importance of local contextual political subcultures, especially the leftist one in the case of Turin.
Beyond Voting: the Multifaceted Nature of Political Participation
The Marx and Picot 2013) . In the survey, the category of temporary workers was built through a series of 'filter' questions asked at the beginning of the interview. The resulting category includes a wide array of contracts: projects, on call, seasonal, self-employed with only one contractor, temporary and fixed-term. In order to test the reliability of temporary workers as a proxy of precarious workers, we ran a series of parametric and non-parametric statistical tests (Kendall's tau, Spearman's rho and Student's t-distribution) crossing the variable on the type of contract with other relevant variables within the dataset. We found that temporary workers display significantly lower levels of income and unionization than workers with open-ended contracts. The survey also shows how their main source of monthly income is not just dependent on their salary, but also on someone else salary. However, this fragility in income is similar to their permanently employed counterparts: descriptive statistics run on the dataset show that there is no statistical difference between the two groups in the perception of financial difficulty that living with their present income generates (see variable "financial difficulty" in Appendix 2 and 4).
Turning to the impact of contextual variables, the impact of political subcultures was considered using leftist political stance while controlling for extreme political positioning. Political positioning is measured using a 0-10 self-positioning scale, while extreme political positioning is a dichotomous variable coded as one for those placing themselves below one or above nine. This codification allows us to test hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 simultaneously. With regard to the other independent variables, we deployed standard operationalizations (see Appendix 2).
Concerning the independent variables, we followed the approach developed by Verba et al. (1978: 51-56; 310-339) that involves the identification of patterns of coherent behaviours called 'modes of political participation' 4 (ibidem). In this article we use a more recent typology developed by Teorell et al. (2007: 345) which identifies four modes: voting, party activity, collective action and consumer participation. The typology is built along two dimensions: channel of expression and mechanism of influence.
The first dimension, channel of expression, is broken down into two broad types: behaviours taking place within the framework of representative democracy and behaviours taking place through extra-representational channels of expression. For the second dimension, mechanism of influence,
Teorell and colleagues rely on Hirschman's popular distinction between 'exit' and 'voice' as distinct political strategies (Hirschman 1970) . More specifically, they identify two representational modes of political participation: 'voting' is the exit-based mode, while 'party activity', by contrast, is the voicebased mode. Voters, in fact, may change party once they are not satisfied (exit strategy), while party members can 'voice' their dissatisfaction in congresses and assemblies (voice strategy). The same dual structure can be applied to extra-representational forms of participation: the exit-based mode is political consumerism (i.e., the choice of boycotting or 'buycotting' specific products), while the voice-based mode is collective action. While political consumerism works according to market-like dynamics, collective action is based upon the flow of information towards (and often, against) political and institutional elites. Italy was not included in the sample. The typology was therefore tested on the sample under investigation using a confirmatory factor analysis based on the four items described above and imposing a varimax rotation given the orthogonal nature of the factors (Appendix 1). 5 Teorell's typology was found to hold valid in the sample and similar labels were given to the factors: voting, party activity, consumer participation and collective action (see Appendix 1 for further details). In the following analysis, though, the factor 'party activity' was dropped from the analysis because all young people actively engaged in that form were precarious, making it impossible to conduct a comparative analysis (see Appendix 3). In a second step of the analysis, we run some robustness checks: one concerning the role of extremism using a quadratic relationship with the political positioning (see Appendix 5) and the other on the role of education. The effect of precariousness at different educational levels was assessed using interaction terms allowing to control for the divide between low educated and highly educated flexible workers (Appendix 6).
The following section illustrates and discusses the results of the empirical analysis by presenting average marginal effects (AME) 7 and predictive margins at representative values to facilitate the interpretation of results. Turning to hypothesis 1.2, concerning the role of a left-wing political positioning on political participation, the findings lead to more nuanced conclusions than expected. While leftist youth were expected to be more active in all modes of political participation, this is not true for voting. In the full model without interaction (model 1 in Appendix 4), political positioning plays a role in both political consumerism and collective action: those with a right-wing political positioning participate less in both forms of political participation (-2.2% and -3.2% respectively). The same trend (also in magnitude) holds valid when precarious workers and workers with open-ended contracts are analyzed separately, using interaction terms. The impact of political positioning is stronger on precarious young people compared to their permanently employed counterparts. For political consumerism, the impact of right-wing political positioning decreases the rate of political participation among regular workers by 1.9 per cent compared to 2.4 per cent for precarious workers.
Engaged Precariat in Turin: Young, Educated and Left-Wing
Whereas for collective action, the expected rate of political participation diminishes by 2.3 per cent for right-wing regular workers compared to -3.9 per cent for precarious young people with the same political positioning. Overall, political positioning seems to influence youth activation in extrarepresentational modes of political engagement, especially in the case of precarious youth. These findings do not mean that right-wing precarious youth are the least active group. The interaction term, presented in Table 2 , assesses the impact of political positioning on precariousness, not the rate of participation in absolute terms. In order to better understand the role of a left-wing political positioning on the Turinese precariat, we deploy figures to highlight the patterns and the rates of political engagement. Considering model 2, the following figures illustrate the predicted probabilities of participating in different forms of political activities (voting, consumerism and collective action) by employment status for different political positioning.
In Figure 1 , the flat line, comprising regular workers, suggests that the probability of participating (around 89 per cent) is not depending on political positioning. At the same time, the upper line, positively inclined from left to right, depicts the predicted probabilities of voting for precarious young people. It also highlights that the previous positive effects of being precarious on the probability of voting (between 6 and 9 per cent) is now statistically non-significant. The loss of explanatory power is represented by the lack of distance between the two lines. In model 2, the effect is thus 'absorbed' by the interaction term, showing that precarious workers are similar to their counterparts with open-ended contracts once political positioning in taken into consideration.
Moreover, the importance of declaring a left-wing political positioning (hypothesis 1.2) does not hold when the effect of job precariousness is taken into consideration. To conclude, the role of education was specifically analyzed because -according to the literature presented above -it is usually considered a strong predictor of political participation.
Moreover, since some scholars suggest that educational levels might play a major role in the process of occupational stabilization or 'precarisation' of career trajectories, a specific control for the mediator effect of education was introduced in the analysis. Results show that educational attainment is not a particularly strong predictor of political participation (Appendix 4). On the other hand, the interaction with job condition is rarely significant. More precisely, in the main model there is no evidence of educational attainment influencing the probability of voting and enacting consumerism, nor a moderating effect while considering the interaction term (Appendix 6). In sum, tertiary education only positively influences the level of mobilization in collective action (Appendix 4) for both precarious and permanently employed youth (Appendix 6).
Job Precariousness: An Emerging Political Cleavage
The Another finding concerns the role played by the interaction between occupational status and leftwing political positioning. While a left-wing political positioning is connected to a higher level of non-representational political activity, the impact is more pronounced for precarious young people than for permanent contract workers.
In addition, left-wing young people participate more in two forms of political participation due to an interaction between political positioning and occupational status rather than the left-wing subculture of Turin. While a leftist political positioning is often a trigger for high levels of political participation among young people, when it interacts with occupational status, the triggering effect is present for both regular and precarious workers. This sheds lights on the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of the article, i.e. the centrality in Turin is not only a matter of leftist political position, but also a matter of more nuanced characteristics at the individual level such as the level of educational attainment, civic skills and occupational status.
To conclude, the article suggests, as highlighted by recent research (Bassoli and Monticelli 2017) , that an insecure occupational status does constitute a contemporary political cleavage able to trigger the political activation of precarious workers both at the individual and collective level (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2010) . In other words, the distinction between precarious workers and workers with open-ended contracts is relevant and should be carefully considered when analysing individual employment trajectories as well as patterns of civic, political and social engagement. More broadly, this article demonstrates how the debate on the struggles of precarious workers in the sociology of work and industrial relations could benefit from a deeper dialogue with interpretive frameworks typical of social movement and political participation studies.
Endnotes:
1) Obviously, different kinds of associations play different roles: for migrants, inter-ethnic organisations are more relevant for political participation (Eggert and Giugni 2010) ; in labour studies, trade unionism plays a central role (Schur 2003) . Among the other types of associations, 'activist associations' are the best predictor of political engagement (Van Der
Meer & Van Ingen 2009); and 'distant organisations' are stronger predictors than 'face-toface' organisations (Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti 2005) .
2) Computer Assisted Telephone Interview.
3) Additional information can be found on the project website anonymized. Data are meant to be public so they can be obtained upon request.
4) The four modes are: voting, campaign activity, communal activity and particularized contacting.
5) An oblique rotation produced analogous results.
6) Occupational status is a categorical variable coded as zero for those unemployed more than 12 months, one for those holding a fixed-term contract, and two for those who are employed with a permanent position.
7) AME calculates the effect on political engagement of shifting from unemployment to regular job or from regular job to precarious work, from non-extreme political positioning to extreme political positioning, from left-wing to right-wing youth, holding all other variables at their observed values.
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Note on Replication Material
The replication dataset is available at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ipsr-risp Worked in a political action group; Signed a petition; Taken part in a public demonstration; Boycotted certain products; Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; Donated money to a political organization or group; Taken part in a strike. Together with these 10 items, we added a further one concerning membership in political parties.
Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 34 years old, and nationality is a dichotomous variable coded as one when the respondent holds Italian citizenship. Education is a categorical variable coded as zero for those having achieved below secondary education, one for those with a secondary education, and two for those with a tertiary education. As for social capital, we took into consideration both existing conceptualisation-by measuring the number of friends (none, less than two friends or more than two)-and civic engagement-union membership and civil society membership, coded as one for members (past and present) and zero for youth who have never been members. Financial resources are taken into account with a proxy. Financial difficulties are measured with a dichotomous variable based on a question asking how difficult it is to cope with one's current income. Financial difficulty is coded as one when the respondent finds it difficult to cope with current income and zero otherwise. Regarding time availability, we took into account the amount of time spent at home looking after relatives. Finally a set of eight items captures the political dimension.
Political interest is measured by asking whether the respondent is interested in politics (four-point scale, dichotomized). Internal political efficacy is measured through a question asking whether persons like themselves have an influence on politics (agreement with the sentence using a four-point scale, dichotomized). Political cynicism is based on a question asking whether political parties are only interested in the respondent's vote (agreement with the sentence using a four-point scale, dichotomized). Political understanding is measured through a question asking 'There are times in which politics is so complicated that people like me don't understand what's going (agreement with the sentence using a four-point scale, dichotomized). Political trust measures if the respondent had any trust in the political system, considering six institutions: three government tiers (national, regional or local level) and both the legislative assembly and the government. Therefore an elevenpoint scale was dichotomized, scoring one for those holding a trust level higher than six and zero otherwise, for each institution. The final score was a dummy valuing one if the respondent trusted at least one institution out of six, zero otherwise. The political dimension is completed by a measure of participants' satisfaction with Italian democracy (ten-point scale, dichotomized). Source: AME are calculated based on annex 5, Model 2 (with all controls and interaction terms) 
